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The ever increasing difficulties  that the European Court of Human Rights (hereafter the 
Court) has faced in handling the remorseless increase in applications being lodged with it 
has been a topic regularly analysed in this journal.1 Indeed, the first issue contained an 
examination of the emerging backlog of cases and President Wildhaber’s initial thoughts 
on institutional reform of the full-time Court.2 In 2007 we noted the Russian Duma’s 
rejection of Protocol 14, thereby preventing Russian ratification of the Protocol.3 Despite 
repeated public requests from both the political and judicial organs of the Council of 
Europe the Russian authorities have still not ratified this Protocol, with the consequence 
that it has not been able to be implemented even though all the other 46 State parties 
had ratified the Protocol by the autumn of 2006. In April 2008 the Chair of the Legal 
Affairs and Human Rights Committee of the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly 
wrote to the Head of the Russian delegation to the Assembly referring to the possibility 
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of parties to a treaty voluntarily applying its provisions on a provisional basis prior to the 
formal entry into force of the treaty.4 She based her letter on Article 25 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969)5 which provides that: 
1. A treaty or part of a treaty is applied provisionally pending its entry into force if: 
(a) the treaty itself so provides; or 
(b) the negotiating States have in some other manner so agreed. 
2. Unless the treaty otherwise provides or the negotiating States have otherwise 
agreed, the provisional application of a treaty or part of a treaty with respect to a 
State shall be terminated if that State notifies the other States between which the 
treaty is being applied provisionally of its intention not to become a party to the 
treaty. 
Subsequently, in October 2009,  President Costa of the Court had a meeting with the 
Committee of Ministers’ Liaison Committee with the European Court of Human Rights 
during which he mooted the “urgent implementation” of some of the procedural reforms 
contained in Protocol 14 because of the “extremely serious situation facing the Court”.6 
He expressed the view that the introduction of the single-judge formation to determine 
the (in)admissibility of weak applications and the empowering of Committees (composed 
of three Judges) to determine the merits of repetitive cases could increase the Court’s 
efficiency by 20-25 percent. These reforms could not solve the workload crisis, but would 
be “an extremely useful contribution”. 
 The Committee of Ministers, working through its Deputies, swiftly acted upon 
President Costa’s suggestion and during the following month the Deputies asked the 
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Steering Committee on Human Rights (CDDH)7 and the Committee of Legal Advisers on 
Public International Law (CAHDI)8 for their opinions on the desirability and methods of 
implementing President Costa’s request. The latter body submitted its opinion on 31 
March 2009.9 CAHDI began by noting that the “fastest, simplest” way of introducing 
these procedural reforms was through all Member States ratifying Protocol 14. It also 
observed  that during the drafting of Protocol 14 the secretariat had suggested 
incorporating an article enabling the provisional application of the Protocol, but that 
States had not then considered it apposite. Now, the Court’s Registry did not foresee any 
technical problems in applying these procedural reforms contained in Protocol 14. CAHDI 
dismissed the idea that such institutional measures could be introduced via a dynamic 
interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (hereafter ECHR) or through 
changes to the Rules of the Court. Also, CAHDI rejected the suggestion that individual 
Member States might issue unilateral declarations consenting to the application of these 
procedural reforms to the determination of applications against them, without an 
agreement between all the Parties to the ECHR. In the view of CAHDI,  States could not 
waive the application of procedural measures designed to benefit applicants 
(presumably, such as the role of Committees of three Judges determining the 
inadmissibility of individual application under Article 28 of the ECHR). 
 CAHDI advised that there were two options “fully compatible with the governing 
principles of public international law” 10 to enable the introduction of the specified 
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procedural reforms before Protocol 14 entered into force. First, a new Protocol 
authorising the temporary use of the designated procedural measures could be agreed 
by the Member States, following the established practice of the Committee of Ministers. 
CADHI recommended that such a Protocol should contain clauses allowing for its 
provisional application (when a defined number of States had expressed their 
agreement) and a “sunset” article terminating the Protocol once Protocol 14 was fully 
ratified. Second, a gathering of the State Parties to Protocol14 reaching an agreement, 
by consensus, to allow the provisional application of the specified measures in cases 
against States that expressed their consent. CAHDI believed that as Protocol 14 does not 
contain an express clause authorising provision application then, in accordance with 
Article 25(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention, the “negotiating States” must agree such a 
development. Monaco, Montenegro and the Republic of Serbia were not negotiating 
States in respect of Protocol 14, as they were not members of the Council of Europe/did 
not exist in their current form, at that time. Subsequently, they ratified the Protocol. 
However, CADHI foresaw no difficulties in enabling them to participate in the agreement 
process. CAHDI noted that Article 25(1)(b) does not elaborate a procedure for 
negotiating States to reach an agreement on provisional application. “Accordingly, a 
decision by consensus and absence of disagreement by any negotiating state would be a 
legally sound basis for an agreement on provisional application.”11 CAHDI advised that 
an agreement on the provisional application of Protocol 14 should contain a clause 
specifying whether it applies to all applications pending before the Court against the 
relevant State. The entering into force of Protocol 14 should result in the termination of 
the agreement on provisional application. Either of the above solutions would involve  
the Court  in using two different procedures when determining applications against 
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Member States according to whether they had consented to the reform measures or 
were still governed by the Protocol 11 process. 
 CDDH produced its Final Opinion in March 2009.12 It observed that the Court’s 
backlog was continuing to grow and had reached 102,720 pending cases in February 
2009.13 Therefore, it supported the swift introduction of the two procedural reforms by 
the Court. Initially CDDH had considered the possibility of also recommending the 
provisional application of the new admissibility criteria contained in Protocol1414, but it 
concluded that it would be best to focus on the two procedural reforms and not seek to 
introduce the provisional application of changes to substantive rights enshrined in the 
ECHR. Like CAHDI the CDDH also considered the prompt ratification of Protocol 14 by 
Russia (not mentioned by name) would be ideal solution. “...[T]his would result in the 
entire Protocol coming into force between three and four months later, thus greatly 
reducing any delay; would present no complications under public international law; 
would avoid any difficulties under the national constitutional law of other State parties 
that have already ratified the Protocol; and would avoid any risks of the Court having to 
operate two different sets of procedures for two sets of states.”15 Nevertheless, 
regarding the modalities of securing the provisional application of the specific procedural 
reforms, CDDH focussed on the two methods examined by CAHDI.  
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 CDDH considered that all the States party to the ECHR should reach an 
agreement to permit the provisional application of the specified procedural reforms by 
individual States which wished to do so. However, CDDH believed that domestic 
constitutional requirements would oblige “most” States to seek parliamentary approval 
before being able to consent to provisional application. As to the option of States 
agreeing a new Protocol 14bis16 CDDH disagreed with CAHDI’s view that the new 
Protocol should contain a clause allowing for its provisional application. In the former’s 
opinion if Protocol 14bis had a low threshold number of ratifications for entry into force 
then provisional application would not be necessary. As to the appropriate size of the  
“critical mass” of State ratifications needed CDDH considered that one, as suggested by 
the Court’s Registrar, would have the benefit of enabling the speediest introduction of 
the reforms; two would be the minimum number relevant for an international agreement 
and three the minimum pertinent for a multilateral agreement. Finally, CDDH observed 
that the options of States agreeing to allow the provisional application of Protocol 14 or 
agreeing Protocol 14bis could both be pursued.  
After receiving the opinions of CAHDI and CDDH the Committee of Ministers’ 
Rapporteur Group on Human Rights (GR-H) worked on a draft of  Protocol 14bis. On 21 
April 2009 the Chair of the Committee of Ministers’ Deputies wrote to the President of 
the Parliamentary Assembly inviting the latter body to give its opinion on the draft 
Protocol, under the urgent procedure of the Assembly at its forthcoming session. The 
Assembly’s Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights produced a Report17 which 
began by acknowledging that: 
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...there is widespread agreement, both within the Parliamentary Assembly and the 
Committee of Ministers that if a temporary, interim solution is not quickly found to 
help the Court to substantially increase its case-processing capacity, the Court will 
be in danger of collapsing under the weight of its caseload.  ... 
If follows that the Court must urgently find a way in which to deal with, in 
particular, three matters: judges must not spend too much time on obviously 
inadmissible cases (approximately 95% of all applications), they must deal 
expeditiously with repetitive cases that concern already clearly established 
systemic defects within states (this represents approximately 70% of cases dealt 
with on the merits) and by doing so, concentrate their work on the most important 
cases and deal with them as quickly as possible.18 
The Report, unlike the government dominated Opinions of CAHDI and CDDH, went on to 
expressly criticise the Russian Parliament. 
The Russian State Duma’s attitude on this subject is difficult to comprehend, 
especially as it’s position is totally out of line with that of all the other 46 State 
Parties to the Convention, including their legislative organs, and even its own 
Executive. ...If it were not for the Russian State Duma’s intransigence, we would 
not have run into the problems we are facing today! So I can only deplore the 
State Duma’s refusal to provide its assent, since December 2006, to the ratification 
of Protocol No 14 by Russia. By so doing, the State Duma has, in effect, 
considerably aggravated the situation in which the Court has found itself, and has 
also deprived persons within the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation from 
benefitting from a streamlined case-processing procedure before the Court.19  
The draft of Protocol 14 bis was endorsed as “a  good interim solution”20 and the Report 
only suggested a few technical linguistic changes to the text21. 
 The Parliamentary Assembly debated draft Protocol 14bis on 30 April 2009.  Mr 
Kox (from the Netherlands) expressed the view that Russia was unlikely to ratify 
Protocol 14 “in the near future”. Nevertheless, he considered that even if Russia was to 
do so the ECHR system still faced the problem that until national judicial systems 
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provided effective protection for Convention rights victims would continue to seek justice 
at Strasbourg. Mr Hunault (from France) noted that the debate was occurring “because 
of the blocking tactics of one of the delegations” and that  Russian members of the 
Parliamentary Assembly were not present to participate in the deliberations. The 
Parliamentary Assembly concluded its debate by approving Opinion 27122 with 39 votes 
in favour and none against or abstaining. The Opinion “strongly deplored” the Russian 
Duma’s stance on Protocol 14 and supported the introduction of Protocol 14 bis as a 
temporary resolution of the problem. 
 After considering the Parliamentary Assembly’s Opinion the Ministers’ Deputies 
agreed, on 6 May, the text of draft Protocol 14 bis. This text incorporated the linguistic 
changes recommended by the Assembly. The draft was then transmitted to the 
Committee of Ministers. At the 119th Session of the Committee of Ministers, held in 
Madrid on 12 May, the High Contracting Parties to the ECHR  organised a separate 
Conference. During that gathering the Member States adopted Protocol 14 bis. They also 
agreed by consensus23 that parties to Protocol14 could consent to the provisional 
application of the single-judge formation and extended powers of Committees to cases 
brought against them. So both strategies endorsed by CAHDI were given effect by the 
Member States. However, the Minsters formally;  
noted that in spite of the efforts undertaken by all member states as collective 
guarantors of the Convention, the conditions for the entry into force of Protocol No. 
14 have still not been met. The Ministers recalled their position on the issue 
expressed at their 118th Session in May 2008, stressing in particular that the entry 
into force of Protocol No. 14 should remain the first priority of the States Parties to 
the ECHR.24 (my emphasis) 
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The Georgian Delegation issued a position paper which, inter alia, took issue with the 
above comments. “Perhaps, too straightforward approach may not be productive, but I 
fear that excessive moderation chosen for the Statement will not solve the issue 
either.”25 We may speculate that given the military conflict between Georgia and Russia 
in the summer of 2008 and the subsequent initiation of large-scale litigation before the 
Court over the matter26 the  Georgian government felt less tolerant of the Russian 
response to Protocol 14 than other Member States. Indeed, we have seen above how the 
Parliamentary Assembly expressly criticised the Duma. Presumably, the Ministers 
adopted a more diplomatic stance in order to both facilitate the Russian government not 
objecting to the Conference’s dual  provisional measures strategy  whilst also seeking to 
avoid inflaming the Duma’s anti-ECHR attitude. 
 Turning to the substance of Protocol 14 bis, the roles and functions of single-
judge formations and the extended powers of Committee have been analysed in a 
previous issue of the Review27 so we shall not repeat ourselves. Interestingly, the final 
text of 14 bis discloses that the Member  States rejected the view of CDDH that it was 
not necessary to incorporate a clause enabling States to authorise the provisional 
application of the Protocol to them. Article 7 provides that:  
[p]ending the entry into force of this Protocol according to the conditions set under 
Article 6, a High Contracting Party to the Convention having signed or ratified the 
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Protocol may, at any moment, declare that the provisions of this Protocol shall 
apply to it on a provisional basis. Such a declaration shall take effect on the first 
day of the month following the date of its receipt by the Secretary General of the 
Council of Europe.28 
The Explanatory Report justified  the inclusion of this “opt in” so as to “facilitate the 
earliest possible application of the protocol with respect to the largest possible number of 
High Contracting Parties, since domestic procedures prior to expression of consent to be 
bound may be lengthy.”29 Under Article 6 of Protocol 14 bis three High Contracting 
Parties have to ratify (or sign without reservation as to ratification) the Protocol for it to 
enter into force. This is the lowest number of ratifications appropriate for a multilateral 
treaty according to the CDDH Opinion we examined previously. The Explanatory Report 
described this threshold as being ““very low... in order to allow the protocol to enter into 
force as quickly as possible.”30  Under Article 8 of the Protocol when either the Protocol 
enters into force or it becomes provisionally applicable to a  High Contracting Party then 
all applications pending before the Court against the relevant State(s) will be determined 
in accordance with the new procedures. Finally, Article 9 provides that when Protocol 14 
enters into force Protocol 14 bis will cease to be in force or be applied on a provisional 
basis (if the minimum number of ratifications had not been achieved). The Explanatory 
Report notes that such a development will make no difference to those States whose 
cases have been determined in accordance with Protocol 14 bis. 
 Protocol 14 bis was formally opened for signature on 27 May 2009 and on the 
same day President Costa, who we have already learnt played a leading role in 
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stimulating the creation of the Protocol, publically “thanked the Member  States that had 
worked hard to make this Protocol possible, thereby showing their attachment to the 
protection mechanism enshrined in the ECHR.”31 Both Denmark and Norway ratified the 
Protocol on that day too. Subsequently, on 17 June 2009, Ireland also ratified the 
Protocol. Consequently, Protocol 14 bis will enter into force on 1 October 2009. 
Furthermore, Norway made a declaration, under Article 7 of Protocol 14 bis, on 25 May, 
so cases pending or brought against that State from 1 June 2009 are being determine by 
the new processes. Denmark likewise made a similar declaration on 3 June so that cases 
against it have been considered under the new arrangements since 1 July 2009. 
 Regarding the other provisional measures option agreed at the Madrid 
conference, Switzerland, on that day, made a declaration that it would accept the 
provisional application of the identical reforms under Protocol 14 to be applied to cases 
pending or brought against it from 1 June 2009. Germany made a similar declaration on 
29 May, which also came into effect on 1 June. The Netherlands and Luxembourg issued 
declarations in June, which became effective on 1 July.32 So, two years after the Court 
hoped that Protocol 14 would be fully in force, the single-judge formations and extended 
powers of Committees have begun to become operational in respect of an expanding 
minority of States. It is regrettable that so much diplomatic and legal effort has had to 
be expended to partially circumvent the Russian Duma’s blocking of Protocol 14. But, on 
a positive note the willingness of the Member States, without the Russian Government 
lodging a formal objection, to utilise innovative techniques (e.g. there has  previously 
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never been a bis Protocol created under the ECHR system) in order to enable crucial 
institutional reforms to be implemented by the Court must be welcomed. The two 
provisional measures strategies agreed at the Madrid conference demonstrate that the 
Member States do genuinely support the need to empower the Court to re-organise its 
methods of processing the torrent of complaints flowing to Strasbourg. Furthermore, the 
rapid action of several States in ratifying Protocol 14 bis or making declarations of 
provisional  application under Protocol 14 provides additional evidence of real 
commitment to the ECHR system. It is to be hoped that the remaining governments will 
be inspired to authorise the application of the single-judge/extended powers Committees 
processes to complaints against their States via whichever provisional measures strategy 
involves the least delay to comply with their constitutional obligations. Then the  next 
major challenge for States regarding their attitude towards future radical reforms of the 
ECHR system is President Costa’s call for a conference to be held  in 2010: 
The idea is for the States, guarantors of human rights, to give human rights 
protection a second wind. That would help to express support for the Court and to 
pump new life into this fifty-year-old by offering it a cure of youthfulness.33 
 
We will no doubt be analysing how this proposal develops in future issues of the Review. 
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